# Agnostic Security: Zero Impact on Portability

> ⚠️ **Status: Proposal / Roadmap**
>
> This document describes proposed approaches and may include hypothetical commands or config.
> For current runtime behavior, see [config-reference.md](../reference/api/config-reference.md), [operations-runbook.md](../ops/operations-runbook.md), and [troubleshooting.md](../ops/troubleshooting.md).

## Core Question: Will security features break...
1. ❓ Fast cross-compilation builds?
2. ❓ Pluggable architecture (swap anything)?
3. ❓ Hardware agnosticism (ARM, x86, RISC-V)?
4. ❓ Small hardware support (<5MB RAM, $10 boards)?

**Answer: NO to all** — Security is designed as **optional feature flags** with **platform-specific conditional compilation**.

---

## 1. Build Speed: Feature-Gated Security

### Cargo.toml: Security Features Behind Features

```toml
[features]
default = ["basic-security"]

# Basic security (always on, zero overhead)
basic-security = []

# Platform-specific sandboxing (opt-in per platform)
sandbox-landlock = []   # Linux only
sandbox-firejail = []  # Linux only
sandbox-bubblewrap = []# macOS/Linux
sandbox-docker = []    # All platforms (heavy)

# Full security suite (for production builds)
security-full = [
    "basic-security",
    "sandbox-landlock",
    "resource-monitoring",
    "audit-logging",
]

# Resource & audit monitoring
resource-monitoring = []
audit-logging = []

# Development builds (fastest, no extra deps)
dev = []
```

### Build Commands (Choose Your Profile)

```bash
# Ultra-fast dev build (no security extras)
cargo build --profile dev

# Release build with basic security (default)
cargo build --release
# → Includes: allowlist, path blocking, injection protection
# → Excludes: Landlock, Firejail, audit logging

# Production build with full security
cargo build --release --features security-full
# → Includes: Everything

# Platform-specific sandbox only
cargo build --release --features sandbox-landlock  # Linux
cargo build --release --features sandbox-docker    # All platforms
```

### Conditional Compilation: Zero Overhead When Disabled

```rust
// src/security/mod.rs

#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
mod landlock;
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
pub use landlock::LandlockSandbox;

#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-firejail")]
mod firejail;
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-firejail")]
pub use firejail::FirejailSandbox;

// Always-include basic security (no feature flag)
pub mod policy;  // allowlist, path blocking, injection protection
```

**Result**: When features are disabled, the code isn't even compiled — **zero binary bloat**.

---

## 2. Pluggable Architecture: Security Is a Trait Too

### Security Backend Trait (Swappable Like Everything Else)

```rust
// src/security/traits.rs

#[async_trait]
pub trait Sandbox: Send + Sync {
    /// Wrap a command with sandbox protection
    fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut std::process::Command) -> std::io::Result<()>;

    /// Check if sandbox is available on this platform
    fn is_available(&self) -> bool;

    /// Human-readable name
    fn name(&self) -> &str;
}

// No-op sandbox (always available)
pub struct NoopSandbox;

impl Sandbox for NoopSandbox {
    fn wrap_command(&self, _cmd: &mut std::process::Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
        Ok(())  // Pass through unchanged
    }

    fn is_available(&self) -> bool { true }
    fn name(&self) -> &str { "none" }
}
```

### Factory Pattern: Auto-Select Based on Features

```rust
// src/security/factory.rs

pub fn create_sandbox() -> Box<dyn Sandbox> {
    #[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
    {
        if LandlockSandbox::is_available() {
            return Box::new(LandlockSandbox::new());
        }
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "sandbox-firejail")]
    {
        if FirejailSandbox::is_available() {
            return Box::new(FirejailSandbox::new());
        }
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "sandbox-bubblewrap")]
    {
        if BubblewrapSandbox::is_available() {
            return Box::new(BubblewrapSandbox::new());
        }
    }

    #[cfg(feature = "sandbox-docker")]
    {
        if DockerSandbox::is_available() {
            return Box::new(DockerSandbox::new());
        }
    }

    // Fallback: always available
    Box::new(NoopSandbox)
}
```

**Just like providers, channels, and memory — security is pluggable!**

---

## 3. Hardware Agnosticism: Same Binary, Different Platforms

### Cross-Platform Behavior Matrix

| Platform | Builds On | Runtime Behavior |
|----------|-----------|------------------|
| **Linux ARM** (Raspberry Pi) | ✅ Yes | Landlock → None (graceful) |
| **Linux x86_64** | ✅ Yes | Landlock → Firejail → None |
| **macOS ARM** (M1/M2) | ✅ Yes | Bubblewrap → None |
| **macOS x86_64** | ✅ Yes | Bubblewrap → None |
| **Windows ARM** | ✅ Yes | None (app-layer) |
| **Windows x86_64** | ✅ Yes | None (app-layer) |
| **RISC-V Linux** | ✅ Yes | Landlock → None |

### How It Works: Runtime Detection

```rust
// src/security/detect.rs

impl SandboxingStrategy {
    /// Choose best available sandbox AT RUNTIME
    pub fn detect() -> SandboxingStrategy {
        #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
        {
            // Try Landlock first (kernel feature detection)
            if Self::probe_landlock() {
                return SandboxingStrategy::Landlock;
            }

            // Try Firejail (user-space tool detection)
            if Self::probe_firejail() {
                return SandboxingStrategy::Firejail;
            }
        }

        #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
        {
            if Self::probe_bubblewrap() {
                return SandboxingStrategy::Bubblewrap;
            }
        }

        // Always available fallback
        SandboxingStrategy::ApplicationLayer
    }
}
```

**Same binary runs everywhere** — it just adapts its protection level based on what's available.

---

## 4. Small Hardware: Memory Impact Analysis

### Binary Size Impact (Estimated)

| Feature | Code Size | RAM Overhead | Status |
|---------|-----------|--------------|--------|
| **Base ZeroClaw** | 3.4MB | <5MB | ✅ Current |
| **+ Landlock** | +50KB | +100KB | ✅ Linux 5.13+ |
| **+ Firejail wrapper** | +20KB | +0KB (external) | ✅ Linux + firejail |
| **+ Memory monitoring** | +30KB | +50KB | ✅ All platforms |
| **+ Audit logging** | +40KB | +200KB (buffered) | ✅ All platforms |
| **Full security** | +140KB | +350KB | ✅ Still <6MB total |

### $10 Hardware Compatibility

| Hardware | RAM | ZeroClaw (base) | ZeroClaw (full security) | Status |
|----------|-----|-----------------|--------------------------|--------|
| **Raspberry Pi Zero** | 512MB | ✅ 2% | ✅ 2.5% | Works |
| **Orange Pi Zero** | 512MB | ✅ 2% | ✅ 2.5% | Works |
| **NanoPi NEO** | 256MB | ✅ 4% | ✅ 5% | Works |
| **C.H.I.P.** | 512MB | ✅ 2% | ✅ 2.5% | Works |
| **Rock64** | 1GB | ✅ 1% | ✅ 1.2% | Works |

**Even with full security, ZeroClaw uses <5% of RAM on $10 boards.**

---

## 5. Agnostic Swaps: Everything Remains Pluggable

### ZeroClaw's Core Promise: Swap Anything

```rust
// Providers (already pluggable)
Box<dyn Provider>

// Channels (already pluggable)
Box<dyn Channel>

// Memory (already pluggable)
Box<dyn MemoryBackend>

// Tunnels (already pluggable)
Box<dyn Tunnel>

// NOW ALSO: Security (newly pluggable)
Box<dyn Sandbox>
Box<dyn Auditor>
Box<dyn ResourceMonitor>
```

### Swap Security Backends via Config

```toml
# Use no sandbox (fastest, app-layer only)
[security.sandbox]
backend = "none"

# Use Landlock (Linux kernel LSM, native)
[security.sandbox]
backend = "landlock"

# Use Firejail (user-space, needs firejail installed)
[security.sandbox]
backend = "firejail"

# Use Docker (heaviest, most isolated)
[security.sandbox]
backend = "docker"
```

**Just like swapping OpenAI for Gemini, or SQLite for PostgreSQL.**

---

## 6. Dependency Impact: Minimal New Deps

### Current Dependencies (for context)
```
reqwest, tokio, serde, anyhow, uuid, chrono, rusqlite,
axum, tracing, opentelemetry, ...
```

### Security Feature Dependencies

| Feature | New Dependencies | Platform |
|---------|------------------|----------|
| **Landlock** | `landlock` crate (pure Rust) | Linux only |
| **Firejail** | None (external binary) | Linux only |
| **Bubblewrap** | None (external binary) | macOS/Linux |
| **Docker** | `bollard` crate (Docker API) | All platforms |
| **Memory monitoring** | None (std::alloc) | All platforms |
| **Audit logging** | None (already have hmac/sha2) | All platforms |

**Result**: Most features add **zero new Rust dependencies** — they either:
1. Use pure-Rust crates (landlock)
2. Wrap external binaries (Firejail, Bubblewrap)
3. Use existing deps (hmac, sha2 already in Cargo.toml)

---

## Summary: Core Value Propositions Preserved

| Value Prop | Before | After (with security) | Status |
|------------|--------|----------------------|--------|
| **<5MB RAM** | ✅ <5MB | ✅ <6MB (worst case) | ✅ Preserved |
| **<10ms startup** | ✅ <10ms | ✅ <15ms (detection) | ✅ Preserved |
| **3.4MB binary** | ✅ 3.4MB | ✅ 3.5MB (with all features) | ✅ Preserved |
| **ARM + x86 + RISC-V** | ✅ All | ✅ All | ✅ Preserved |
| **$10 hardware** | ✅ Works | ✅ Works | ✅ Preserved |
| **Pluggable everything** | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes (security too) | ✅ Enhanced |
| **Cross-platform** | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes | ✅ Preserved |

---

## The Key: Feature Flags + Conditional Compilation

```bash
# Developer build (fastest, no extra features)
cargo build --profile dev

# Standard release (your current build)
cargo build --release

# Production with full security
cargo build --release --features security-full

# Target specific hardware
cargo build --release --target aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu  # Raspberry Pi
cargo build --release --target riscv64gc-unknown-linux-gnu # RISC-V
cargo build --release --target armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf  # ARMv7
```

**Every target, every platform, every use case — still fast, still small, still agnostic.**
